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Abstract
This paper examines how a shock to collateral value, caused by asset market fluctuations,
influences the debt capacities and investments of firms. Using a source of exogenous variation in
collateral value provided by the land market collapse in Japan, I find a large impact of collateral
on the corporate investments of a large sample of manufacturing firms. For every 10 percent
drop in collateral value, the investment rate of an average firm is reduced by 0.8 percentage
point. Further, exploiting a unique data set of matched bank-firm lending, I provide direct
evidence on the mechanism by which collateral aﬀects investment. In particular, I show that
collateral losses results in lower debt capacities: firms with greater collateral losses are less
likely to sustain their banking relationships and, conditional on lending being renewed, they
obtain a smaller amount of bank credit. Moreover, the collateral channel is independent of the
contemporaneous influence of worsened bank financial conditions.
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I. Introduction
This paper investigates how a shock to collateral value, caused by asset market fluctuations, influ-
ences the debt capacities and investments of firms. It makes two contributions to the literature.
First, using detailed data at both firm and loan levels, it identifies and quantifies, for the first
time, the economy-wide impact of a large decline in the asset markets on firms’ debt capacities and
investment decisions. Second, it provides new evidence on whether and how financing frictions,
inversely measured by the firms’ abilities to collateralize, aﬀect corporate investment. Overall, the
evidence highlights the importance of external credit constraints in transmitting booms and busts
in the asset markets, particularly the property market, to the real economy.
In recent years, asset markets around the world have experienced large swings in prices. As
a result, there have been increasing concerns among academics and policy makers about the real
consequences of asset market bubbles. A sizable theoretical literature, dating back as far as Fisher
(1933), suggests a “collateral channel” through which the burst of a bubble in asset markets might
aﬀect the real economy: a large decline in asset markets adversely aﬀects the value of collaterizable
assets which hurts a firm’s credit-worthiness and reduces its debt capacity; a lower debt capacity, in
turn, leads to reduced investment and output (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 1990, Kiyotaki and
Moore 1997). This “collateral channel” is potentially important, because bank loans, the dominant
source of external financing in all countries (Mayer, 1990), are typically backed by collateral. How-
ever, despite a strong belief among the theoretical literature about the importance of the collateral
channel, there has been little empirical work that identifies and quantifies its full economic impact.
This paper is an eﬀort to fill this gap.
An analysis of the role of collateral also contributes to our understanding of how capital market
imperfections, and the resulting financing frictions, might aﬀect firm investment. Financing frictions
are not directly observable to empirical researchers. Following an influential paper by Fazzari et al.
(1988), researchers have focused on firms’ reliance on internal funds and interpreted the observed
investment responses to cash flow as evidence of financial constraints (see Hubbard, 1998, for a
survey). Recent research, however, has raised serious questions both about the interpretation
of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity and about the validity of using investment-cash flow
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sensitivity to measure financial constraints in the first place (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 and
2000; Alti, 2003; and Gomes, 2001). Examining investment responses to collateral value provides
a new test of the eﬀect of financial constraints on investments. To the extent that collateral can
mitigate the informational asymmetries and agency problems in external financing relationships,
a firm’s ability to collateralize reflects the frictions it faces in raising external funds and serves as
a better measure of the degree of financial constraints. Further, due to the natural link between
collateral and bank lending, it is possible to pin down the mechanism by which financing frictions
aﬀect investment, which helps rule out alternative intepretations of the results.
Japan’s experience in the early 1990s provides an ideal experiment, for at least three reasons.
First, it resolves the endogeneity problem typically encountered in this type of studies. In Japan,
corporate borrowing is traditionally collateralized by land. Between 1991 and 1993, land prices
in Japan dropped by 50%, a shock that was unambiguously exogenous to any individual firm.
Since firms suﬀered losses in collateral proportionate to their land holdings prior to the shock,
their pre-shock land holdings can serve as an exogenous instrument to measure the change in the
value of collateral. This focus on cross sectional variations in collateral is important because, while
this economic shock can also aﬀect firms’ investment opportunities, its influence is systematic and
should be uncorrelated with firms’ idiosyncratic land holdings. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to argue
that land holdings prior to the shock (in 1989) were strongly associated with information about
investment opportunity in the post-shock period (1994-98), which was more than five years later.
Second, the Japanese setting allows me to further pin down causality by investigating how
losses in collateral value are related to lower debt capacities. The main challenge here lies in the
fact that banking relationships are not randomly assigned. Therefore, there might be unobserved
bank characteristics that simultaneously aﬀect credit availability and bank-firm relationships. For
example, firms with more land holdings might have borrowed from banks that prefer to extend loans
secured by land. If these same banks later run into trouble, one may observe a spurious relationship
between land holdings and reduced bank credit. Using a unique sample of matched loans between
publicly traded firms and their banks, I can fully control for unobserved bank characteristics and
examine whether the same bank lends less to firms with larger land holdings.
A third advantage of the Japanese setting is that Japanese firms are well known for their close
banking relationships. Since durable banking relationship may weaken the eﬀect of a (negative)
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shock to collateral, a significant relationship between collateral value and debt capacity detected
in this sample is strong evidence of the collateral channel.
Based on a large sample containing all the publicly traded manufacturing firms in Japan, I
find a significant collateral-damage eﬀect during the five-year period after the land price collapse.
Losses in collateral value reduce a firm’s borrowing capacity and the firm responds by cutting back
on its investments. Such an eﬀect is economically significant: for every 10 percent drop in land
value, the investment rate is reduced by 0.8 percentage point. As further evidence of causality, I
find that collateral losses lead to lower debt capacities of firms. All else equal, firms that suﬀer
greater collateral losses are less likely to sustain their banking relationships and, conditional on
lending being renewed, they obtain a smaller amount of bank credit. Moreover, the collateral
channel is independent of the contemporaneous influence of worsened bank financial conditions.
To my knowledge, this is the first study that provides direct evidence on the mechanism through
which collateral influences investment, using a matched sample of bank-firm lending.
The Japanese experience has implications for the U.S. and other countries. Around the world,
collateral plays an important role in bank lending. For example, it has been estimated that about
70% of all commercial and industrial loans are made on a secured basis in the U.S., U.K, and
Gemany (see Berger and Udell, 1990; Harhoﬀ and Korting, 1998; Binks et al.,1988). An important
form of collateral is real estate.1 Given the recent booms in the property markets around the world,
Japan’s experience in the 1990s is particularly valuable. It suggests that, while durable banking
relationships may mitigate the eﬀect of a decline in collateral value, the collateral channel remains
powerful in transmitting a decline in the property market into the real economy.
The collateral channel also has important implications for the transmission of monetary policy.2
According to the “balance-sheet channel,” a tightening of monetary policy through higher interest
rate impairs collateral value and thus the net worth of certain borrowers, diminishing their ability
to borrow (e.g., see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; and Bernanke et al., 1996). This issue is of
considerable concern in the current U.S. policy debates. To the extent that findings about the
investment behavior of industrial firms is indicative of the spending behavior of consumers, this
paper suggests that, if the raising of rates by the Federal Reserve burst the bubble in the housing
1For example, according to the World Bank Investment Climate Survey of 28,000 firms in 58 emerging markets,
real estate constitutes 50% of firms’ collateral (see http://iresearch.worldbank.org/ics/jsp/index.jsp). Tests in Hurst
and Lusardi (2004) suggest that real estate is an important source of collateral for entrepreneurial firms in the U.S.
Davydenko and Franks (2005) report that real estate is the most widely used collateral in Germany and the U.K.
2 I thank the referee for pointing out this important implication of the paper.
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market, it would be diﬃcult for U.S. consumers to continue to borrow against their home values to
fuel consumption, which can result in a larger-than-expected economic contraction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes why the land-market
collapse in Japan in the early 1990s provides a good natural experiment. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 presents evidence of the eﬀects of a shock to collateral value on investments. Section
5 presents evidence of the eﬀects of collateral losses on firms’ debt capacities. Section 6 discusses
the generality of the Japanese experience and the some other explanations of the recession in Japan
in the 1990s. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. The Land-Price Collapse In Japan in the Early 1990s
The Japanese economy in the second half of the 1980s is frequently characterized as a “bubble”
economy by analysts (e.g., Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, 1997; French and Poterba, 1991). Land
prices in Japan almost tripled in the second half of the 1980s. At its peak in 1990, the market
value of all the land in Japan, according to several estimates, was four times the land value of the
United States, which is 25 times Japan’s size. The boom was followed by an equally sharp fall in
the early 1990s. Between March 1990 and the end of 1993, the land price dropped by almost one
half. Meanwhile, stock prices experienced a similar pattern of boom and bust.
While detecting the “bubble” is beyond the scope of this study, there is evidence suggesting
that the boom in the equity and land markets cannot be justified by fundamentals. For example,
French and Poterba (1991) report that none of the usual suspects, including accounting diﬀerences,
changes in required stock returns or growth expectations, can explain the movements of stock
prices and price-earning ratios in Japan in the late 1980s and earlier 1990s. They also find that the
value-to-rent ratios in the Japanese land market in the 1980s behaved like price-earning ratios in
the Japanese stock market, suggesting a deviation of land prices from fundamentals.
Japanese banks traditionally extend loans only on a secured basis.3 The monetary authority
also encourages the collateralization principle through periodic bank examinations (Shimzu, 1992).
This institutional feature mitigates the concern as to who collaterizes and whether collateral proxies
3Some researchers propose that unsecured loans collide with the Japanese social custom of never (openly) judging
others (Shibata, 1995). In preparing for a departure from the doctrine of land collateral after the land prices collapsed,
one major city bank classified its clients into three categories: those who qualified for unsecured loans, those whose
borrowing had to be personally guaranteed, and those whose requests for loans would be declined. Client corporations
were so upset to learn that they could be put in the second and third categories that the system was not implemented
(Shibata, 1995).
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for firm quality. This is an important advantage because the theoretical banking literature has not
reached a consensus on what types of borrowers are likely to put up collateral. On one hand,
Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Boot, Thakor, Udell (1991) suggest that good borrowers will
use collateral to signal its quality. On the other hand, Rajan and Winton (1998) propose that
collateral, along with covenants, improves the creditor’s incentive to monitor and banks demand
more collateral from bad firms. These diﬀerences, however, becomes unimportant for the Japan
setting as everyone has to put up collateral.
This setting provides an excellent setting to test for the eﬀect of collateral because it resolves
the two empirical diﬃculties commonly encountered in this type of study. First, due to a lack of a
secondary market for collateralizable assets such as machinery and inventory, collateral value may
not be observable. In Japan, land is the most important form of collateral and 70% of secured
loans are backed by land (Bank of Japan). Since there is a secondary market for land, land value
is observable. The second diﬃculty is that collateral is endogenous to investment. When firms
make investments, they build plants and purchase machines, all of which can serve as collateral. In
addition, increased investment opportunity may simultaneously drive investment and the market
value of existing collateral. Therefore, even if one observes a correlation between investment and
collateral, it is hard to establish causality. The almost 50% drop in land prices between 1990 and
1993 is unambiguously exogenous to the cash flow or profitability of any one individual firm. Firms
lost collateral proportionate to their land holding prior to the shock; therefore the pre-shock land
holding provides an exogenous measure of the change in collateral value. Moreover, using a unique
sample of matched loans between lenders and borrowers including all publicly traded firms and
banks, I can identify the eﬀect of collateral losses on firms’ borrowing capacities, which provides
direct evidence on the mechanism through which collateral aﬀects investment.4
It is worth noting that obtaining an accurate estimate of declines in land value is never easy.
Most available land price series are based on appraisals, which may not accurately reflect market
value. However, market transaction data also suﬀer from some well-known flaws. For example,
they usually do not control for property types or quality (e.g., location, size, etc.) and may suﬀer
from a sample-selection bias. A distinct feature of my experiment is that it does not depend on an
4Some Japan experts have recognized that land price appreciation in the 1980s was related to the high rate of
investment (see Kashyap, Scharfstein, and Weil, 1993 and Ogawa and Suzuki, 1999). This paper diﬀers from these
studies in two important aspects. First, I explicitly deal with the endogeneity issues using a natural experiment.
Second, I document the mechanism through which collateral aﬀects investment using detailed loan-level data.
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accurate estimate of land prices: with a 50% drop in land prices, any variations due to estimation
error or location are of second order. Therefore, land holding prior to the shock is a reasonably
clean measure of cross-sectional losses in collateral value. Later I check the robustness of the results
to regional variations in land prices using price data in the 47 prefectures.
III. The Data
The data mainly come from the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ), which contains detailed
accounting data on all publically traded non-financial firms. Its main advantage over NIKKEI
NEEDS, a popular database for Japanese studies, is that it contains a detailed breakdown of five
depreciable capital goods, as well as asset specific gross and current period depreciation, which
enables a more accurate calculation of the replacement cost of capital and the investment rate net
of asset sale. Other data sources include NIKKEI NEEDS for share prices and the wholesale price
index (WPI) for prices of output and investment goods.
Following Hayashi and Inoue (1991), I apply diﬀerent physical depreciation rates to construct
the capital stock by the perpetual inventory method.5 To construct the market value of land, I
again apply the perpetual inventory method, which involves a long time series of land prices and
firms’ book value of land back to the 1960s (see the Appendix for details).
The sample contains all manufacturing firms in the DBJ database. My sample period include
five years after the shock during 1994-1998. I drop firms that do not have enough data to construct
the capital stock measure or have missing stock price data, firms that were involved in mergers and
acquisitions between 1989 and 1998, and, if a firm changes its accounting period, the year in which
such a change occurs.6 The final sample contains 847 firms. Table I presents the sample summary
statistics. Column (1) of Table I displays the firm characteristics. Note that the average investment
rate for Japanese firms during this period is heavily right-skewed with the median (0.09) being only
about half of mean (0.24). In columns (2) and (3) of Table I, I divide the sample into land-holding
companies and non-land-holding companies, based on whether the firm has market value of land to
the replacement cost of capital above the top quartile of the industry in 1989. All the variables are
5There has been numerous procedures in the literature for estimating capital stock and Tobin’s q. The most well
known methods for Japanese data are from Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) and Hayashi and Inoue (1991). Their methods
diﬀer mostly because of their available data. As the data in this paper matches that in Hayashi and Inoue (1991), I
follow their methodology.
6The Japanese fiscal year ends in March. However, many firms file late in the year. I define the fiscal year for a
particular observation as the previous year if the firm filed before or in June, and as the current year if the firm files
after June.
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adjusted by the industry median. Land-holding companies are significantly smaller, have more cash
stock and fewer future investment opportunities. They also have less debt, but rely significantly
more on bank debt. Their average investment rates are not significantly diﬀerent from the control
group. Interestingly, according to the median which is a more eﬃcient measure of the location
for skewed distribution, land holding companies invest significantly less than the control group,
consistent with the collateral hypothesis.
IV. Collateral Eﬀects on Corporate Investment
This section investigates whether losses in collateral value, caused by the real estate collapse,
aﬀect firms’ investment behavior. I hypothesize a collateral-damage eﬀect: the shock reduces firms’
collateral value and thus their borrowing capacities, which is translated into lower investment rates.
One might, however, propose an alternative story. Suppose that there were two companies, A
and B, in the same industry and that company A had more land than company B before the shock.
After the shock, although the collateral value of company A is much less, it still has more collateral,
which should enable it to borrower thus invest more. It is helpful here to examine what happened
to the additional land at company A prior to the shock. The first possibility is that company A
used its additional land to borrow more and to invest more before the shock. If this is the case,
comparison of investment rates should be made after controlling for the investment levels prior to
the shock. This is because, after the shock, banks would be hesitant to extend the same amount
of credit and, as a result, the firm would invest less relative to its investment prior to the shock.
The second possibility is that company A did not borrow more than company B because it decided
to kept the additional debt capacity unused.7 This suggests that one needs to control for leverage,
especially the extent to which the firm pledged land as collateral. As is discussed later, my results
are robust to inclusion of leverage-related variables and the pre-shock investment level as controls.
In addition to the collateral-damage eﬀect, it is possible that firms with larger land holdings have
to rely more on internally generated cash, since they face more binding financing constraints. Thus,
land-holding companies may have higher investment sensitivities to internal liquidity. Therefore, I
7 It is also possible that company B had other forms of collateral (such as plant and machinery) that allowed it
to borrow as much as company A. However, in this case, company A would still have a larger collateral losses since
other form of collateral did not suﬀer the same loss as did land.
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estimate the base-line model as follows:
I/K = a+bq+cCASH/K+dLand/Kpre+eCASH/K ∗LANDCO+ f Industry Dummies (1)
I/K is the fixed investments normalized by the beginning-period replacement cost of capital. As
it is diﬃcult to know how long it takes for the collateral eﬀect to show up in investment, I examine
the average investment rate during the five years after the shock, 1994-1998. All the independent
variables except cash stock are also averaged across years. q is Tobin’s q measured as the total
market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of capital (excluding land).8 CASH/K is
internal liquidity with two measures: the cash flow which reflects funds entering the firm during the
sample period and the cash stock in 1993 which reflects funds entering the firm in earlier periods.
Both measures are normalized by the capital stock. Land/Kpre is the market value of land in
1989 normalized by the replacement cost of capital. LANDCO is a dummy variable indicating
whether or not a company is a land-holding company. Industry dummies control for diﬀerences
in land-holdings due to industry-specific production technologies. The coeﬃcient d captures the
collateral-damage eﬀect.
The last coeﬃcient, e, deserves a special note. To the extent that firms suﬀering greater collat-
eral damage have to rely more on internal cash to finance their investment projects, e is expected
to be positive. Recent literature, however, has raised serious doubt about this interpretation (e.g.,
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Alti, 2003; and Gomes, 2001). Therefore, while it may be worthwhile to
control for the structural diﬀerences in investment responses to internal liquidity between the two
groups of firms, the results should be interpreted with caution. In fact, the diﬃculty in interpreting
the internal liquidity eﬀects actually highlights the importance of looking beyond investment-cash
flow sensitivity in testing for the eﬀects of financing constraints on corporate investment.
A well-documented problem in estimating an investment equation is the measurement error
resulting from using average q in place of marginal q (Erickson and Whited, 2000). This paper
explicitly deals with this problem in two ways. First, by research design, I exploit a source of
variation in collateral value that is plausibly uncorrelated with investment opportunities. Specifi-
cally, I measure loss in collateral value with pre-shock land holdings in 1989, which are not likely
to be strongly associated with information about investment opportunities more than five years
8 I exclude land from q calculation to minimize the eﬀect of the land-price collapse on q. The results are qualitatively
similar if I include land in q.
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later during 1994-98. Later, I will check the robustness of the results by only using information
in the collateral measure that is orthogonal to variables related to firm quality and /or investment
opportunities. Second, I do not simply infer causality from the investment equation. Rather, I
explicitly examine the mechanism through which collateral influences investment, using a unique
data set of matched bank-firm lending.
A related issue is how the collapse in the stock market might have aﬀected the tests. A decline in
stock prices is reflected in firms’ q. If one believes that q is a reasonable control for marginal product
of capital, it is already included in the estimation. However, a number of studies have pointed out,
both theoretically and empirically, that investments respond to both the fundamental and the
non-fundamental components in stock prices (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Chirinko and
Schaller, 2001; Baker, Stein, Wurgler, 2003). In the Japanese setting, the bust in the equity market
is largely a correction to the boom in the second half of the 1980s, after which the non-fundamental
component in stock prices is mostly gone (Goyal and Yamada, 2003). As my sample period is after
the correction, q should mostly reflects the fundamental component.9
Regarding the estimation technique, recall that in Panel A of Table I, the investment rate is
right-skewed. It turns out that the conditional distribution is also skewed, suggesting that the
OLS estimators are not eﬃcient. Therefore, I estimate median or least absolute distance (LAD)
regressions.10 Unless otherwise specified, the standard errors are calculated based on the method
suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1982).
A. Basic Results
Table II shows a significant collateral-damage eﬀect: the coeﬃcient on pre-shock land holding,
Land/Kpre, is significantly negative at the 1% level (columns (1) and (2) of Table II). The co-
eﬃcients on the interaction between the land-holding company dummy and the two measures of
internal liquidity (cash flow and cash stock) are significantly positive at the 1% level, which is
consistent with the conjecture that land holding companies, facing tighter financial constraints,
9Of course this implicitly assumes that the non-fundamental component in q is greater or equal to zero. What
if equity prices reflect a pessimism sentiment after the bust? If this sentiment aﬀects the land-holding companies
more than the control group, the negative relationship between land holding prior to the shock and investments may
be driven by the fact that land-holding is a proxy for the pessimistic sentiment in q. This, however, does not seem
to be the case because, compared with the control group, land-holding companies on average experienced a lower
percentage drop in q (15% v. 47%).
10For an overview of LAD and quantile regressions in economics research, see Koenker and Hallock (2001). Koener
and Bassett (1978) show that the regression median is more eﬃcient than the least squares estimator in the linear
model for any distribution for which the median is more eﬃcient than the mean in the location model.
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rely more on internally generated funds. However, given the controversy over investment-cash flow
sensitivities, this interpretation should be taken with caution. In the remaining of this paper, I
focuses on the investment responses to collateral.
Column (3) of Table II controls for the timing of land purchases. Firms that purchased land at
the peak of the bubble would suﬀer larger collateral losses. I include in the estimation the proportion
of land (in market value) purchased from 1988 to 1990 (%Recent Purchase), and its interaction
with the land-holding company dummy. The coeﬃcient on %Recent Purchase is positive but not
statistically significant, probably because land purchased more recently is for planned investments.
The interaction term is significantly negative (1% level), suggesting that firms are not able to
undertake planned investments if their overall collateral positions are severely damaged.
In column (4) of Table II, I examine how leverage aﬀects the estimation, motivated by two
considerations. First, leverage has been reported to be negatively related to future growth (Lang,
Ofek, and Stulz, 1996). Thus, if land-holding companies are more leveraged, they may invest less
not because of collateral but because of high leverage. Second, firms that have pledged more of
their land as collateral would be more aﬀected by the shock. I thus create a dummy variable
indicating firms with debt- -to-land ratio in 1989 above the top industry quartile (High Debt-to-
Land dummy) and let it interact with pre-shock landholding. As reported in column (4) of Table
II, this interaction term is, as expected, significantly negative (10% level). Leverage itself has a
positive but insignificant coeﬃcient, probably because in an economy where debt is the dominating
source of financing, leverage may also reflect lending relationships and/or firm quality.
In column (5) of Table II, I examine whether firms, facing collateral losses, cut back investment
relative to its investment level prior to the shock. Controlling for the pre-shock investment level
does not change any of the earlier findings. Notice that, although pre-shock investment has a
significant coeﬃcient, it contributes little to the overall fit of the regression model, with the Pseudo
R2 virtually unchanged.
Finally, I check whether my estimates imply economically meaningful magnitudes. I compare
the investment rates of two hypothetical firms. One is a median firm with every control variable
at the median; the other is identical in all dimensions except that it had land holding in 1989 at
the 75th percentile (which is 12.2 percentage point above the median). According to the baseline
estimation in column (1) of Table II, the higher land holding has a direct eﬀect of reducing the
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investment rate by 1.6 percentage point (−0.128 ∗ 0.122). Given that the median firm has an
investment rate of 9%, this is a non-trivial eﬀect since it implies a 18% reduction in investment
rates. My estimates also suggest a significant sensitivity of investment to asset-market movements:
for every 10 percent drop in land prices, the investment rate of an average firm (with Land/Kpreof
67%) is reduced by 0.8 percentage point (= −0.128 ∗ 67% ∗ 10%).
B. Further Analysis
B.1. Is Land Holding Merely A Proxy For Firm Quality?
An alternative interpretation of my results is that land holding is simply picking up (negative)
information about growth opportunities. However I measure changes in collateral value using land
holdings prior to the shock (in 1989), which are not likely to be strongly correlated with investment
opportunities more than five years later in the post-shock period (1994-98). Nevertheless, this
alternative interpretation deserves some consideration because, as shown in Table I, land-holding
companies tend to be smaller and with fewer growth opportunities.
Two tests are useful in ruling out the above interpretation. The first is the test in which the
investment rate prior to the shock is controlled for (column (7) of Table II). If land holding is a
proxy for firm quality, land-holding companies may have always invested less. Therefore, controlling
the pre-shock investment level would render the collateral eﬀect insignificant. However, the results
in Table II suggest the opposite. In the second test, I include additional control variables that are
commonly used to reflect firm quality, that is, three-year sales growth (robust to one-year growth),
the gross margin (defined as operating income over sales) and size (log of assets), all measured in
1989. This way I only use information in the pre-shock land holding that is not related to firm
quality in assessing the collateral eﬀects. As reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table III, there
are not any qualitative changes from the earlier results. These robustness checks, combined with
the lending tests in Section V., which identifies the mechanism through which collateral aﬀects
investment, further suggest that mis-measurement in q is not a serious concern in my tests.
B.2. Does Group Aﬃliation Make a Diﬀerence?
Japanese corporate finance is characterized by a main bank system. I examine whether group
aﬃliation has any impact on the collateral eﬀects. I use Dodwell Marketing Consultant’s Industrial
Groupings in Japan to classify whether a firm belongs to a corporate group or a Keiretsu. A slightly
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lower proportion of land-holding companies have group aﬃliations (42% v. 33%). When I estimate
Equation (1) separately for group and non-group aﬃliated firms, the collateral eﬀects only exist
for non-group firms (columns (3) and (4) of Table III). This result is consistent with the findings
by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) that main banks are eﬀective in supporting client firms
when they are in financial diﬃculty. This result, however, does not seem to be robust to alternative
classifications of keiretsu firms. When I rerun the tests based on another popular publication
Keiretsu no Kenkyu published by the Keizai Chosa Kyokai (Economic Survey Association).11 There
is not any diﬀerence in collateral eﬀects between group and non-group firms.
These findings shed light on the recent debate on the main bank system. Allegedly, close aﬃli-
ation with a bank helps to avoid adverse selection and mitigate moral hazard problems. However,
in light of the non-performing loan problems in the 1990s, scholars began to recognize that the
keiretsu system also has its costs and they questioned if the supposed benefits of main banking
actually accrued to the firm (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). More radically, in an article titled “The
Fable of keiretsu,” Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) argue that keiretsu simply never existed, but rather
... began as a figment of the academic imagination, and they remain that today.” The results in
this paper provide some support of the benefit of the main bank system. The sensitivity of the
results, however, suggests that the main bank system does not seem to be very well defined.
B.3. Overinvestment or Underinvestment?
Theoretical work on the collateral channel predicts underinvestment due to collateral losses (e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 and 1990; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Jensen (1986) and others,
however, have argued that managers tend to invest free cash flow in negative net-present-value
projects. Under this view, land holding companies may have taken advantage of the price run-
up in the 1980s and borrowed excessively to finance thier pet projects. The drop in investments
after the collapse is simply a correction to the overinvestment problem. Note that although this
hypothesis changes the interpretation, it does not negate the eﬀect of collateral on firm investments.
Nevertheless, this issue is important because it relates to our understanding of both the recession
in Japan in the 1990s in particular and the real eﬀect of collateral on the economy in general.
11Both Keiretsu no Kenkyu and Dodwell publications classify Keiretsu firms based loan structure, bank share-
holding, and historical factors. Dodwell’s definition of group firms is narrower than Keiretsu no Kenkyu and are
stabler over time. Using the Dodwell classification, less than 4% of the firms in the sample switch into or out of their
groups over a 13-year period.
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I perform two tests to distinguish between these two hypotheses. First, the overinvestment
theory predicts that firms with poor investment opportunities would be hurt more because their
investment depends more on collateral value than on the availability of good projects. Therefore,
I include in the estimation an interaction term between collateral and a low-q dummy indicating
whether a firm’s average q during 1994 - 1998 is below the industry median. The overinvestment
story would predict the coeﬃcient to be negative. However, results in column (5) of Table III does
not support the overinvestment hypothesis: this coeﬃcient is insignificantly positive. In the second
test, I explore whether collateral aﬀect major investments, a type of investment that is less likely
to be driven by the agency problem. Using quantile regressions at the 90th percentile, I find that
collateral position aﬀect major investments, which is supportive of an underinvestment story.12
C. Robustness Checks
C.1. Investments prior to the shock
Presumably, a collateral channel should also exist during the bubble period, as firms with more
land might have taken advantage of the increased collateral value and invested more. However,
quantifying this eﬀect is diﬃculty due to endogeneity issue discussed earlier. Nevertheless, as a
robustness check, I examine the response of investment during the bubble period (1986-1989) to
land holding in 1985, controlling for Tobin’s q and internal liquidity. I find that, consistent with
Kashyap, et. al. (1993), the coeﬃcient on land holding is significantly positive (not reported).
C.2. Regional variations of land prices
My tests implicitly assume that firms’ land holdings are subject to the same price shock. There are,
however, variations in price drops across regions. While regional variation in price drops is of second
order given the size of the shock, it is worth checking the robustness of my findings. Therefore,
I collect data on land prices in all the 47 prefectures in Japan and incorporate a location-specific
loss factor (based on firm location) in the estimation.13 None of the earlier results change (not
reported). Although the problem can be completely resolved only if data on the exact locations
of diﬀerent parcels of land owned by firms is available, if both tests yield qualitatively the same
results, it probably means that land location does not play an important role in the estimation.
12The detailed results are available from the author upon request.
13Arguably, land prices may diﬀer even within a prefecture, e.g., depending on the purpose of land (residential,
commercial, and industrial). However, this should not be a concern, since my sample only contains manufacturing
firms and I have controlled for the industry eﬀect by including industrial dummies in all the regressions.
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C.3. Other robustness checks
Other robustness checks include alternative measures of land holding and definitions of the sample
period. The earlier results are robust to measures of land holding as market value of land over
total market value of the firm and over the total book value of assets; to the alternative cutoﬀ for
land-holding companies at the industry median (rather than the top quartile); to the alternative
definition of the sample period as between 1994 and 1997; and to an additional control of firms’
access to the bond market (the definition of this variable will be discussed in more detail in the
lending tests in the next section).
V. Collateral Eﬀects on Corporate Borrowing
So far, I have presented evidence of the collateral channel. While the tests are designed to deal
with the endogeneity problem, the interpretation of results would be more convincing if evidence
on the mechanism through which the shock to collateral influences investment can be provided. In
particular, does the loss of collateral reduce firms’ ability to obtain external funds and particularly
bank lending? Would the presence of durable banking relationships weaken the eﬀect of collateral
losses? Is the collateral channel independent of the eﬀect of banks’ (worsened) financial conditions?
The Japan setting is particularly suited to this test, given that Japanese firms are well known for
their close relationships with their banks. If I find a significant collateral eﬀect in Japan, it is strong
evidence of the importance of collateral in credit allocation.
A. Model Specifications
If banking relationships are randomly assigned, one can simply compare the amount of credit avail-
able to firms with diﬀerent levels of land holdings. Banking relationships, however, are not random
and there might be unobserved bank characteristics that simultaneously aﬀect credit availability
and selection of bank-firm relationships. For example, firms that prefer to store more land may
have formed banking relationships with banks that prefer to grant loans secured by land. If these
”land-loving” banks later had to cut back lending due to the collapse in land prices, one may
observe a (spurious) relation between land holding and credit availability. This problem can not
be resolved by simply adding control variables related to bank healthiness, such as credit ratings
or bank capital for at least two reasons. First, bank healthiness is endogenous and depends criti-
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cally on client firms’ performance. Second, some of the bank characteristics that aﬀect both credit
availability and banking relationships may not be observable.
I deal with this diﬃculty using a sample of matched firm-bank lending data containing all the
publicly traded manufacturing firms and their banks. This data tracks, for any given bank, its
lending to multiple firms with diﬀerent levels of land holdings. Therefore, I can examine whether
the same bank would grant fewer loans to firms with larger land holdings. In a regression framework,
I estimate the following model of loan growth with bank fixed eﬀects:
Lendingij = a+ b Firm characteristics+ c Relationship characteristics+ dLand/K
pre
i + uj , (2)
subscript i indexes firms; j indexes banks. Lendingij is a measure of credit availability, which I will
discuss shortly. Firm control variables include variables related to investment need and demand
for credit, namely, Tobin’s q and measures of internal liquidity (cash flow and cash stock). The
eﬀect of cash flow, however, is not an exte clear. To the extent that it reflects future profitability,
it measures the demand for credit. However, if firms follow a pecking-order financial policy, higher
cash flow reduces loan demand. Relationship variables are measured in the ten years (1984-1993)
prior to my sample period. They are duration, which reflects the private information the lender
has about the firm (see e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1992); the natural log of the number of banks,
which reflects the firm’s eﬀort in economizing monitoring cost, as well as the lender’s information
monopoly; whether the bank was the firm’s biggest lender at least once from 1984 to 1993, which
is motivated by the fact that while Japanese firms borrowed from multiple banks (16 banks on
average), they concentrate about one-third from a single institution; the bank’s equity stake, which
allows the lender to share future surpluses and thus mitigates the “hold-up” problem; and, lastly,
whether the bank is the firm’s main bank. Land/Kpre is the market value of land in 1989 normalized
by capital stock, and uj is the bank fixed eﬀect. The coeﬃcient d captures the collateral-damage
eﬀect and is expected to be negative.
I measure credit availability using the log of a firm’s long-term borrowing from a particular
bank during 1994-1998 normalized by the average borrowing from the same bank during the five
years prior to the shock (1984-89). I focus on long-term borrowing because it is strongly associated
with Japanese fixed investments and is typically backed by land (Kwon, 1998; Hibara, 2001). The
contractual features of long-term loans necessarily mean that the loan balances adjust slower than
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desired by the lender. Therefore, after loan demand is controlled for, a large loan balance can arise
both from the lender’s willingness to lend and from lending decisions in the past. Normalizing loan
balances by those in earlier years helps separate out the eﬀect of prior lending decisions.
It is worth noting that using the amount of bank lending to measure credit availability implicitly
assumes that the amount of debt used is the amount of debt available to the firm. This assumption
is defensible for two reasons. First, on the firm’s side, firms generally face tighter credit constraints
due to their collateral losses. On the lender’s side, after the collapse of stock and land prices, banks,
facing mounting non-performing loans and severe losses in their security holdings, had to tighten
credit.
In my sample, of all the firm-bank pairs in 1989, about 18% did not have a lending relationship
during the sample period.14 To correct for the potential survivorship bias, I estimate a selection
model using Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regressions. The first stage is a probit regression of
whether the relationship survived; the second stage is an ordinary-least-squares regression of loan
growth. To the extent that the credit allocation is a two-step process in which the bank first
decides whether to lend and then decides how much to lend, the selection model provides insight to
both decisions. In addition, the firm characteristics prior to the shock is more likely to aﬀect the
lending/ no-lending decision whereas the contemporaneous firm characteristics tend to aﬀect the
second decision more. Therefore, in the first-stage regression, firm controls are measured in 1989,
which naturally serve as instruments to help identify the lending equation.
B. Findings
Column (1a) of Table VI reports the first-stage probit regression results. Relationship variables
are important in determining the chance of loan renewal. Duration, being a big lender to the
firm, and equity stake all significantly increase the probability for the bank to renew loans (the 1%
level). Probably because I have already controlled for diﬀerent aspects of the lending relationship,
the coeﬃcient on the main-bank dummy is not statistically significant. Somewhat surprisingly,
the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s q is significantly negative. This is probably because, due to the well-
documented long-run reversal of stock prices, when the stock market collapsed in the late 1980s,
firms that enjoyed the boom the most and therefore had higher q’s may have experienced bigger
14 I exclude firm-bank pairs that ended between 1990-93 because these relationship may have been terminated due
to reasons other than the collapse in land prices. The results are qualitatively similar if I keep these observations in
the sample.
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drops in stock prices. Therefore, a higher q in the late 1980s may indicate a lower q in the post-shock
period, all else equal. Cash stock has a significantly negative sign (at the 10% level), suggesting
that cash stock reduces financing need. Lastly, firms suﬀered larger collateral losses have a significal
lower chance of loan renewal (the 10% level). Interestingly, firms with more recent land purchases
have a greater chance of continued relationships, probably reflecting that the loans made for the
land purchase have not been paid oﬀ.
In the second-stage OLS regression (column (1b) of Table VI), the coeﬃcient on the inverse Mills
ratio is significant, indicating that the sample-selection bias does have an impact on the estimation.
Consistent with a collateral-damage eﬀect on credit allocation, the coeﬃcient on Land/Kpre is
significantly negative at the 1% level. Among the relationship variables, equity stake is significantly
positive as expected. Duration, however, is significantly negative, probably reflecting that some of
the loans granted earlier have been paid back. Notably, the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s q is insignificant,
which seems to be consistent with media reports that Japanese banks are protective of their weak
clients with whom they have good relationships and that investment opportunities becomes a
relatively unimportant in credit allocation.
An alternative intepretation of the above results is that land-holding companies borrowed less
not because of their collateral losses but because of access to other sources of financing, e.g., the
public bond market. Starting from November 1990, the bond market was liberalized and all the
oﬃcial restrictions were abadoned. However, firms still need at least an investment grade (i.e., a
rating equivalent to S&P’s BBB rating or higher) to issue public debt, which means larger and more
profitable companies had better access to the bond market (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001).15 Recall
from Table I that land-holding companies tend to be smaller than the control group, suggesting
that it is less likely that their lower loan growth is due to borrowing from alternative sources.
Nevertheless, to further check this hypothesis, I measure a firm’s access to the bond market based
on the rating agencies’ accounting criteria for an investment grade (reported in Hoshi and Kashyap
(2001). I include a dummy variable indicating whether a firm met these criteria at least once during
1994-1998.16 As reported in column (2a) of Table VI, firms with bond eligibility have higher chance
15According to Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), the accounting criteria based on which the government restricted public
bond issuance before 1990 were similar to the criteria that rating agencies use to grant an investment grade. In that
sense, despite the deregulation, the “actual” criteria for bond issuance stay largely the same.
16Note that this is a relatively less restrictive cutoﬀ. As the oﬃcial restrictions are lifted, firms can issue bond
whenever they get an investment grade, whereas prior to 1990 government may have required the issuer to meet the
criteria during the several years prior to the actual issuance. However, the results on collateral eﬀects are robust to
the alternative cutoﬀs of meeting the criteria 3 or 4 times out of 5 years.
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of loan renewal (1% level), suggesting that they are more desirable bank customers and that firms
do not terminate lending relationships during bad times even if they have access to alternative
sources of financing. However, the overall impact of bond market access on lending is insignificant,
as shown in column (2b) of Table VI. Meanwhile, the earlier results remain qualitatively the same.
To examine the economic significance of the results, again consider a median firm and another
firm which is identical in every aspect except for a land holding at the 75th percentile. The
marginal impact of land holding on the probability of loan continuation evaluated at the median
is −0.066. Thus the probability of continued relationship is 0.8% (= −0.066 ∗ 0.122) lower for the
75th percentile firm, which is moderate compared to the unconditional probability of relationship
survival (82%). However, the overall impact of collateral is significant: the 75th percentile firm is
expected to have a growth rate that is 6 percentage points (= 0.494 ∗ 0.122) lower than that is for
the median firm. This magnitude is clearly economically important.
C. Re-Examining the Collateral Channel with Bank Controls
While the above results confirm the workings of a collateral channel through reduced borrowing
capacity, I cannot completely rule out the possibility that, as the burst of the bubble also damages
the banks’ financial conditions (e.g., through their lending to the real estate sector, see Gan, 2006),
the influence of collateral on investment is due to banks’ losses on their real estate loans that are
correlated with the firms’ collateral losses.17 This possibility deserves serious consideration, as the
bank and the firm may own real estate that is geographically proximate or they have a similar
taste for land. In fact, both a lending channel (through banks’ financial conditions) and a collateral
channel (through firms’ collateral losses) are likely to be at work. Therefore, it is important to
control for investment cutback due to the bank’s financial conditions, so that one could be sure
that the collateral channel identified in this paper does not simply pick up the eﬀect of a lending
channel.
Recall that Japanese firms source one-third of their borrowing from the top lender. Therefore,
I control for the financial condition of the top lender, using two measures. The first is the bank’s
lending to the real estate sector, which on average accounted for 5.5% of assets in 1989. When
land prices dropped by half, many of these loans went bad which hurt bank health significantly.
Arguably, the impact of such losses on the bank’s ability to lend should depend on how well it is
17 I thank the referee for pointing out this possibility and suggesting tests to deal with this problem.
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capitalized. Therefore, I also control for the bank’s capital ratio in 1989.
For each firm in the matched lending data, I identify its top lender and then match with the DBJ
financial data.18 I re-estimate the investment equation with bank controls. As shown in columns
(1)-(4) of Table VI, both measures of the top lender’s financial conditions are significantly negative,
as expected. Meanwhile, the collateral eﬀects remain unchanged, suggesting that the collateral and
the lending channels have their independent influences on firm investments.
One remaining concern is that the bank’s financial health is not fully captured in their real estate
loans and / or capital positions. To mitigate the concern, I add bank dummies to the investment
equation and thus control for both observed and unobserved bank characteristics. The collateral
eﬀects remain qualitatively the same (columns (5)-(8) of Table VI).
These results, combined with the earlier results on bank lending, help pin down the causality of
a collateral eﬀect. That is, the collateral channel works through firms’ reduced borrowing capacity
and is independent of the eﬀect of banks’ financial conditions.
VI. Discussions
A. The Applicability of the Japanese Experience
While Japan provides an excellent setting to test the collateral channel, it is useful to discuss, at this
point, how the findings may apply to other countries. It should be noted that the Japanese settting
utilizes a very unusual economic environment with a shock of an extraordinary size. Although its
exact relation is hard to estimate due to the rare occurrences of bubbles, the marginal impact of
collateral losses may depend on the size of the bubble. Therefore, while the results in this paper
are very useful to predict a directional collateral channel after the burst of bubbles, the exact
magnitude should not be simply extrapolated.
It is also worth noting that, according to the measures in La Porta et al. (1998), Japan has a
relative strong creditor rights protection. Moreover, despite the occasional press reports that some
borrowers hired yakuza (gangsters) to sit on properties which made it hard for banks to collect on
some commercial real estate collateral, the overall quality of law enforcement in Japan ranks among
the top across all countries. For example, it takes only 60 days to enforce a standard debt contract
18The sample size drops to 472 firms during this matching. However, there does not seem to be any systematic
pattern in the firms dropped. Indeed, the earlier results in Tables 3 and 4 can be reproduced (i.e., both the magnitudes
of the main coeﬃcients and their significant levels) in this smaller sample. In the interest of brevity, I do not report
these results; but they are available upon request.
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in Japan, whereas the world average is 234 days and the average for countries with the English
law original (which has better enforcement in general) is 176 days (La Porta et al., 2003). Secured
creditor rights and their enforcement may explain, at least partially, the dominance of bank finance
and the economic growth in Japan.
While this strengthens the argument for using the Japan setting to test for a collateral channel,
an understanding of the relationship between creditor rights and use of collateral is helpful in
assessing the generality of the Japanese experience. Such a relationship, however, is not clear cut
and unfortunately there is little research on this regard. On the one hand, one may hypothesize
that a lack of creditor rights would discourage the use of collateral and the banks may not lend at
all. On the other hand, it is possible that weak creditor rights prompt lenders to demand collateral
since this is at least something that they could hope to get hold of in case of a default. In both
cases, it seems reasonable to argue that, conditional on loans being granted, they are likely to be
collateralized, which is consistent with the popularity of secured loans around the world. Base on
these considerations, one might expect that the lessons learned from the Japanese experience are
quite general.
B. Other Explanations of the Post-Bubble Recession in Japan
This paper emphasizes tighter credit constraints due to the burst of real estate bubble as a con-
tributing factor to Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s. I now discuss how this explanation is
related to other explanations that have been proposed by analysts.
Gan (2006) emphasizes the role of a lending channel in propagating the downturn. The burst of
asset market bubbles impaired the financial condition of banks, since they had significant exposure
to asset markets either through their real estate lending or through their direct holdings of equity
and land. To the extent that banks are liquidity constrained and that firms cannot substitute
other sources of financing for bank lending, a bank liquidity shock can significantly reduce firm
investment and valuation. This lending channel, together with the collateral channel identified in
this paper, points to two powerful ways by which asset market bubbles may be transmitted into
the real economy.
Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) and Peek and Rosengren (2005) propose that Japanese banks’ ever-
greening of loans and the resulting misallocation of funds contribute to the economic decline in the
1990s. Indeed total domestic bank lending did not decline till mid-1990s. However, this pattern is
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likely to be driven by lending to firms in the real estate sector which steadily increased from the
early 1990s till 1998. Lending to the manufacturing firms, which is the focus of my lending tests,
started to decline as soon as the bubble burst. To the extent that banks over-lent to other more
problematic firms, such as firms in the real estate sector, the “ever-greening” incentive at banks
may have exacerbated the impact of the collateral channel among manufacturing firms.
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) point out a slowdown in total factor productivity growth, rather
than financial constraints, as the main reason for Japan’s “lost decade of growth.” They argue
that Japanese firms do not seem to be financially constrained as they hold much more cash than
the U.S. firms and small firms have steadily increased their cash holding since 1996. Cash holding,
however, is endogenous. Theoretical work has shown that in a multi-period setting, an improved
liquidity position may make a firm more conservative in its investment choices, if it anticipates
being constrained in the future (Dasgupta and Sengupta, 2003). Recent findings that financially
constrained firms save a bigger fraction of their cash balances during recessions support this view
(Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). Therefore, larger cash holdings are not inconsistent
with the main point in this paper. Moreover, to the extent that firms, facing collateral losses, have
to curtail investment in productivity-improving technologies, the total factor productivity in the
economy would be lowered.
VII. Conclusions
When the bubble in the Japanese land market burst in the 1990s, the value of collateralizable assets
plummeted. This eﬀect was especially pronounced among firms with larger land holdings prior to
the shock. This paper demonstrates that the bursting of this asset bubble had an enormous impact
on investment behavior and credit allocation.
The empirical setting is ideal because it does not suﬀer from the problems that normally plague
these types of studies. Exploiting an exogenous variation in the change of collateral value, I find
that collateral significantly aﬀects investment decisions of firms in the manufacturing sector. The
eﬀect is large: for an average firm, every 10 percentage drop in land value implies a 0.8 percentage
point reduction in investment rate. Bank lending provides further evidence on the mechanism
through which shocks to collateral aﬀect investments. Using matched firm-bank data and hence
controlling for possible endogenous selection of banking relationships, I find a significant collateral
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eﬀect on bank credit allocation. That is, firms with greater collateral losses are less likely to sustain
their banking relationships and, conditional on loan renewal, they obtain a small amount of bank
credit. Additionally, the collateral channel remain unchanged after the influence of worsened bank
financial conditions is controlled for.
This study also has macroeconomic implications. The eﬀect of collateral can be cumulative: as
many collateralizable assets are also inputs into a firm’s production process, a drop in investment
decreases future revenues, which further reduces the firm’s collateral value and thus its invest-
ments (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Kashyap, Scharfstein, and Weil, 1993). This feedback eﬀect
generates credit cycles and amplifies the decline in the asset markets.19
Overall, the results highlight an economically significant collateral channel through which ex-
treme movements in asset markets are transmitted to the real economy. As real estate is an
important form of collateral world-wide and the property markets around the world have experi-
enced unprecedented booms in recent years, Japan’s experience in the 1990s is particularly relevant.
It suggests that the collateral channel can be powerful in transmitting a decline in the property
market into the real economy.
19This credit-multiplier eﬀect has been employed by Almeida and Campello (2004) and Braun and Larrain (2004)




This Appendix describes the calculation of replacement cost of capital and market value of land
for the firms in my sample.
A. Replacement Cost of Capital
The perpetual inventory calculation is carried out separately for each of the five types of capital
goods (land is calculated separately as described in A.2). Let Ki,t be the real stock of asset i at
the beginning of period t, Pi,t the corresponding tax-unadjusted price at the beginning of year t,
and δi,t the asset-specific depreciation rate. Then, the perpetual inventory recursion is based on
the relationship
Pi,tKi,t+1 = (1− σi,t)Pi,tKi,t +NOMIi,t, (A.1)
or, alternatively,




where NOMIi,t is nominal investment in asset i during period t valued at beginning of period t
price. The recursion is started for all asset types in 1961, or the first year the firm enters the data
set. To start the recursion, Pi,0Ki,0 is assumed equal to the beginning of period book value in 1961
of the corresponding asset type as listed on the firms balance sheet at the end of 1960 (or the year
after the firm is listed if later than 1960). The key is to determine nominal investment, NOMI,
for each asset type:
NOMIi,t = KNBi,t+1 −KNBi,t +DEPi,t, (A.3)
where KNBi,t is the book value of the net stock of asset i during time t, DEPi,t is accounting
depreciation on asset i during period t. Due to data availability, NOMIi,t is calculated in diﬀerent
ways depending on the time period. For more details, see Hayashi and Inoue (1991).
B. Market Value of Land
Define LANDt as the real value, and LANDBt as the book value of land, both at the beginning
of period t. Assuming a LIFO valuation process, the recursion equation for land is, as suggested
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by Hoshi and Kashyap (1990),




where Pt = Pt if ( LANDBt+1 - LANDBt ) > 0, and Pt = Pt−x where x is the number of periods
that have passed since the last time ( LANDBt+1−x - LANDBt−x ) >0.
Unlike the capital stock calculation, assuming that P0LAND0 = LANDB0 (i.e. that the market
value and the book value are equal in the first period) is diﬃcult because the book value and market
value of land had already diverged significantly by 1960. To get around this, Hayashi and Inoue
(1991) suggest a conversion factor of 7.582446 be applied to the book value to generate P0LAND0
for firms that existed prior to 1969. P0LAND0 = LANDB0 for all firms that enter later.
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Table I. Summary Statistics
Raw statistics
 The Whole Sample Land-holding companies The Control Group
(1) (2) (3)
Sales ($mil) 165.47 37.58*** 149.95
(48.62) (-5.79)*** (15.04)
Cash flow / K 0.08 0.17 0.00
(0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Cash / K 1.23 1.94** 0.24
(0.55) (0.26)*** (-0.03)
EBDIT / Total assets 0.03 -0.01* 0.00
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
I / K 0.24 0.46 0.07
(0.09) (0.01)** (0.02)
Debt / Total assets 0.12 0.00** 0.02
(0.11) (-0.01)*** -0.01
Bank debt / Debt 0.56 -0.02*** -0.10
(0.59) (0.03)*** (-0.11)
Tobin's q 0.99 0.06*** 0.35
(0.74) (-0.15)*** (0.12)
Number of firms 847 212 635
This table presents descriptive statistics on various firm characteristics in Japan. Column (1)
presents the whole-sample summary statistics averaged over the sample period between 1994 and
1998. Columns (2) and (3) present the industry-adjusted statistics (adjusted by the median) for the
sub-samples of land-holding companies and the control group. The table presents the mean of each
characteristic, with the median in the parentheses. Land-holding companies are defined as the
companies with market value of land to total replacement cost of capital above the industry top
quartile. The remaining firms serve as the control group. Significance levels for the difference
between the landholdingcompanies and the control groups are based on two-tailed tests; significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Statistics adjusted by the industry median
30
(1)                 (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5)                 
Cash flow / K 0.415*** 0.216*** 0.142*** 0.126*** 0.146***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032) (0.039)          
q 0.019*** 0.005*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Land / Kpre -0.128*** -0.165*** -0.142*** -0.153*** -0.138***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028)
Cash flow * Landco 0.569*** 0.717*** 0.759*** 0.783*** 0.761***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033) (0.040)
Cash/K 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Cash * Landco 0.102*** 0.169*** 0.162*** 0.160***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
% Recent purchase 0.002 0.039 0.014
(0.042) (0.041) (0.051)








Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 824 751 708 708 708
Psuso R2 0.137 0.243 0.311 0.312 0.312
Collateral Effects on Fixed Investments: Basic Results
Table II. 
This table presents the effect of loss of collateral on firm investments based on Least Absolute Distance
(LAD) Regressions. The dependent variable I/K is the average investment rate (defined as fixed
investments over the beginning-of-period capital stock) between 1994 and 1998. Cash flow / K is cash
flow over the beginning-of-period capital stock. q is Tobin's average q, Land/Kpre is the market value of
land over the replacement cost of capital in 1989. Landco is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Land/Kpre is 
above the top industry quartile and 0 otherwise. Cash/K is the cash stock over the beginning-of-period
capital stock at the end of 1993. % Recent purchase is the proportion of land (in market value) purchased
during 1988-1990. High Debt-to-Land is a dummyvariable indicating firms with debt over market value of
land in 1989 above the top quartile. I / Kpre is the investment rate prior to the shock in 1989. Standard




(1)                    (2)                    (3)                    (4)                    (5)                    
Cash flow / K 0.120*** 0.156*** 0.217*** 0.101* 0.135***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.041)             (0.060)             (0.029)             
q 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.029*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)             (0.000) (0.000)
Land / Kpre -0.038*** -0.031*** 0.030 -0.151*** -0.154***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.045) (0.022)
Cash flow * Landco 1.442*** 1.466*** -0.188*** 0.780*** 0.774***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.045) (0.062) (0.029)
Cash stock / K 0.001 0.009** -0.004 0.030*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Cash * Landco 0.140*** 0.123*** 0.000 0.206*** 0.167***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005)
% Recent purchase 0.053 0.03 0.019 0.037
(0.054) (0.043) (0.084) (0.036)
% Recent purchase * Landco -2.283*** -0.021 -1.716*** -0.619***
(0.441) (0.125) (0.168) (0.088)
Leverage 0.117*** 0.045 -0.017 0.02
(0.037) (0.037) (0.065) (0.029)
Land / Kpre * High Debt-to-Land -0.026* 0.014 -0.015 -0.027**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.013)
Additional Proxies for Firm Quality
Sales growth -0.032 -0.025
(0.025) (0.033)
Profit margin 0.035 0.072
(0.069) (0.067)




LHpre * Low-q 0.012
(0.010)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 716 651 290 418 708
Psuso R2 0.328 0.359 0.055 0.531 0.312
Table III.
Collateral Effects on Fixed Investments: Additional Tests
This table presents additional tests of the effect of loss of collateral on firm investments. The dependent variable I/K
is the average investment rate (defined as fixed investments over the beginning-of-period capital stock) between 1994
and 1998. Cash flow / K is cash flow over the beginning-of-period capital stock. q is Tobin's average q, Land/Kpre is
the market value of land over the replacement cost of capital in 1989. Additonal proxies for firm quality are measured
in 1989. Profit margin is operating profits over sales, sales growth is the sales growth in the past three years. Landco
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Land/Kpre is above the top industry quartile and 0 otherwise. Cash/K is the cash
stock over the beginning-of-period capital stock at the end of 1993. % Recent purchase is the proportion of land (in
market value) purchased during 1988-1990. High Debt-to-Land is a dummy variable indicating firms with debt over
market value of land in 1989 above the top quartile. I / Kpre is the investment rate prior to the shock in 1989.
Standard errors are based on the asymptotic variance in Koenker and Bassett (1982) and are presented in parentheses.
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Table IV. Summary Statistics on the Lending Relationships and the Firms' Top Banks







Duration (1984-93) 8.32 8.21 8.37
(9.00) (9.00) (9.00)
Number of banks (1984-93) 16.37 15.65 1.65
(14.00) (13.00) (0.00)
% Equity stake (1993) 1.61 1.49 16.63
(0.00) (0.00) (14.00)
Log loan growth (1994-98 v. 1984-89) 0.34 0.17*** 0.40
(0.30) (0.09)*** (0.42)
% of Relationships with the bigbanker 0.179 0.159 0.187
% of Relationships with the main bank 0.113 0.092* 0.122
% of firms with BBB or above rating (1989) 0.513 0.602*** 0.481
% of firms with BBB or above rating (1994-98) 0.723 0.684** 0.738
Total number of firm-bank pairs 3,194                    
Bank Charateristics
% Real estate loans 0.055 0.053 0.055
(0.037)                  (0.037)                (0.037)              
Capital ratio 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.028)                  (0.028)                (0.028)              
This table presents descriptive statistics on banking relationships in the matched lending sample. Column (1)
presents the whole-sample summary statistics averaged over the sample period between 1994 and 1998.
Columns (2) and (3) present the statistics for the sub-samples of land-holding companies and the control group.
The table presents the mean of each statistic, with the median in the parentheses. Land-holding companies are
defined as the companies with market value of land to total replacement cost of capital above the industry top
quartile. The remaining firms serve as the control group. Significance levels for the difference between the
landholding companies and the control groups are based on two-tailed tests; significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table V
Collateral Effects on Corporate Borrowing
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Relationship Characteristics
Duration (1984-89) 0.193*** -0.421*** 0.193*** -0.403***
(0.013) (0.040) (0.013) (0.038)
Number of banks (1984-89) 0.007 -0.015 0.017 -0.024
(0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078)
Bigbanker (1984-89) 0.457*** -0.082 0.454*** -0.060
(0.097) (0.083) (0.096) (0.082)
Equity ownership 0.094*** 0.033* 0.094*** 0.039**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Main Bank 0.113 -0.120 0.123 -0.112
(0.102) (0.089) (0.103) (0.089)
Access to Bond Market 0.131*** -0.039
(0.050) (0.063)
Firm Characteristics
Log of assets -0.044 -0.041 -0.039 -0.041
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
q -0.106*** 0.001 -0.112*** 0.001
(0.023) (0.002) (0.023) (0.002)
Cash flow/K 0.144** 0.103 0.131* 0.103
(0.067) (0.131) (0.067) (0.130)
Cash/K -0.025* -0.017 -0.023* -0.017
(0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.021)
Collateral Related Variables
Land/Kpre -0.240* -0.487*** -0.294** -0.494***
(0.135) (0.187) (0.132) (0.188)
% Recent purchase 4.100*** 1.051 4.154*** 1.265*
(1.050) (0.729) (1.072) (0.732)
% Recent purchase * Landco 1.026 -3.570 1.133 -3.507
(3.043) (3.387) (3.140) (3.407)
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.247*** -1.022**
(0.472) (0.454)
Number of observations 3191 2626 3191 2626
Psuso R2 / R2  0.162 0.300 0.164 0.300
This table presents the effectof collateral losses on bank lending based on Heckman two-stage regressions. The first stage
is a probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the survival of the lending relationship. q is
Tobin's average q. Cash flow/K is cash flow over the beginning-of-periodcapital stock. Cash/K is the cash stock over the
capital stock at the end of 1993. Duration is the number of years that the firm-bank pair had positive loan balances. Big
banker is whether the bank served as the firm's largest lender at least once. Main bank is a dummy variable equals to 1 if
the bank is also the firm's main bank and zero otherwise. Equity ownership is the percent of shares owned by the bank.
Number of banks is the number of banks with which the firm had lending relationships. Land/Kpre is the market value of
land over the capital stock in 1990. Landco is a dummy variable equals to 1 if Land/Kpre is above the top quartile in the
industry and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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(1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)           (6)           (7)           (8)           
Cash flow / K 0.191*** 0.184*** 0.186*** 0.149* 0.192** 0.199** 0.187* 0.177*
(0.047)      (0.052) (0.047) (0.084) (0.092) (0.095) (0.109)     (0.097)     
q 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.037** 0.029 0.028 0.037** 0.038*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020)     
Land / Kpre -0.093*** -0.113*** -0.082*** -0.092* -0.114* -0.118* -0.134* -0.112**
(0.025)      (0.030) (0.027) (0.057) (0.065) (0.064) (0.080) (0.053)     
Cash flow * Landco 0.687*** 0.760*** 0.750*** 0.759** 0.696 0.764 0.756 0.745
(0.048)      (0.053) (0.049) (0.386) (0.547) (0.500) (0.516) (0.587)     
Cash/K 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.028* 0.023** 0.024** 0.016 0.023
(0.006)      (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)     
Cash * Landco 0.213*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.188** 0.212* 0.200** 0.194** 0.190**
(0.006)      (0.007) (0.007) (0.088) (0.111) (0.098) (0.097) (0.082)     
% Recent purchase -0.078 -0.100 -0.045 -0.046 -0.115 -0.1
(0.094) (0.088) (0.098) (0.119) (0.126) (0.110)     
% Recent purchase * Landco -2.496*** -2.509*** -2.417** -2.466 -2.246 -2.169
(0.338) (0.305) (1.161) (2.224) (1.738) (2.767)     
Leverage 0.052        0.018        (0.007)      0.042 0.007 0.028
(0.043)      (0.039)      (0.044)      (0.065) (0.067) (0.063)     
Land / Kpre * High Debt-to-Land -0.013 -0.006 -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009
(0.015)      (0.014)      (0.025)      (0.020) (0.023) (0.019)     
I_Kpre 0.091*** 0.103* 0.117* 0.117*
(0.008)      (0.058)      (0.063) (0.070)     
Additional Proxies for Firm Quality
Sales growth -0.099 -0.063
(0.175)      (0.134)     
Profit margin 0.199 0.277
(0.189)      (0.203)     
Log (size) 0.007 0.004
(0.005)      (0.006)     
Bank characteristics
% Real estate loans -0.286* -0.429** -0.366** -0.339*
(0.177)      (0.190)      (0.177)      (0.196)      
Capital ratio 2.139** 2.833*** 2.263** 2.538*
(0.984)      (1.071)      (1.001)      (1.319)      
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 472 420 420 420 472 420 420 420
Psuso R2 0.460 0.551 0.556 0.558 0.482 0.570 0.576 0.579
Including Bank Characteristics Including Bank Dummies
This table presents the effect of loss of collateral on firm investments after controlling for the firm's top lender characteristic
The dependent variable I/K is the average investment rate (defined as fixed investments over the beginning-of-period capital 
stock) between 1994 and 1998. Cash flow / K is cash flow over the beginning-of-period capital stock. q is Tobin's average q
Land/Kpre is the market value of land over the replacement cost of capital in 1989. Landco is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
Land/Kpre is above the top industry quartile and 0 otherwise. Cash/K is the cash stock over the beginning-of-period capital 
stock at the end of 1993. % Recent purchase is the proportion of land (in market value) purchased during 1988-1990. High 
Debt-to-Land is a dummy variable indicating firms with debt over market value of land in 1989 above the top quartile. I / 
Kpre is the investment rate prior to the shock in 1989. %Real estate loan is the bank's real estate loan over assets in 1989. 
Capital ratio is bank equity over assets in 1989. Standard errors are based on the asymptotic variance in Koenker and Basset
(1982) and are presented in parentheses.
Table VI
Collateral Effects on Fixed Investments: Controlling for Bank Characteristic
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